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Abstract: Canonical analysis of the classical general equilibrium model
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that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria. This paper shows
that the analogous result is not true in urban economies. An open subset
of economies where none of the rational expectations equilibria fully reveal
private information is found. There are two important pieces. First, there
can be information about a location known by a consumer who does not live
in that location in equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium rent does not reflect
this information. Second, if a consumer’s utility depends only on information
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is proved. Space can prevent housing prices from transmitting information
from informed to uninformed households, resulting in an inefficient outcome.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
People can never fully comprehend the quality and the circumstances of a
city until they experience a significant part of their life living in that city.
Information on physical amenities of a city (i.e., weather, parks, museums,
crime, traffic jams) is easily acquired by both consumers and researchers,
so there is institutional and academic work on the quality of life in cities.1
However, people cannot completely ensure that they choose the right city
or location within the city for their family before they start experiencing
life there. For example, there could be uncertainty about the quality of
schools, congestion of commuting routes contingent on resident and business
location, or even major highway closures. Current occupants of the city, or
people with friends living in the city, might have information that others
don’t have. Moreover, even though the current environment of the city can
be understood, it is not surprising that the future developments of cities are
not known with certainty, but might be known better by current occupants.2
On the one hand, information about life in a city is reflected in the de-
mand for and thus the price of housing in the city.3 Since people are rational
in understanding and using the relationship associating a specific state of
nature with a specific equilibrium price, depending on what model people
have in mind for how equilibrium prices are determined, the price of housing
can be a signal for people in choosing a city best suited to their life style.
Recall that the concept of rational expectations equilibrium requires agents
to use models that are not obviously controverted by their observations of
the market. Therefore, the question of whether the price of housing can play
1For example, Rosen (1979), Roback (1982), and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988)
develop a quality of life index for urban areas (QOLI), that measures or implicitly prices
the value of local amenities in urban areas.
2For example, Cronon (1991) discusses the success of Chicago in surpassing other com-
petitive cities, such as St. Louis, in the early development of the Midwest.
3It can also be reflected in wages, but for simplicity we focus on rent.
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a significant role in transmitting information from informed people to unin-
formed people not only addresses the question of the efficiency of housing
markets, but is also related to the issue of the existence of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium in urban economics.
Available information is utilized by agents in a rational expectations equi-
librium, especially the information conveyed by equilibrium prices. Radner
(1979) shows that in a particular asset trading model, if the number of states
of initial information is finite then, generically, rational expectations equilib-
ria exist where all traders’ private initial information is revealed. In contrast
to Radner’s model, that fixes state-dependent preferences and then focuses
on the information concerning traders’ conditional probabilities of various
events, Allen (1981) considers a space of economies that is defined by state-
dependent preferences and confirms Radner’s conclusion in that context.
When state space is infinite, Allen (1981) shows that the generic existence of
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria depends on the condition that
the price space must have at least as high a dimension as the state space.
Jordan (1980) considers a model where information revealed by endogenous
variables can be affected by expectations, and then characterizes the data
that allow the generic existence of rational expectations equilibria. Jordan
concludes that unless the public prediction is based on a very narrow class of
data, a statistically correct expectation may fail to exist even for otherwise
well-behaved economies.
The existence of rational expectations equilibria where prices do not fully
reveal the state of nature motivates the development of this paper. As shown
in standard general equilibrium models in the literature, fully revealing ra-
tional expectations equilibrium demonstrates the efficiency of market prices
in information transmission. The cases where the rational expectations equi-
librium is not fully revealing are more interesting, for they admit a positive
value of private information (that cannot be learned by observing prices)
and space for discussing purchases of and strategic behavior using private
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information. In contrast with standard models, this paper focuses on the ex-
istence of non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In contrast
with Allen (1981), who proves the existence of an open and dense subset of
economies that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria in the
standard general equilibrium model with a finite number of states, this paper
shows that the analogous result does not hold in urban economies. An open
subset of economies is found, where all the rational expectations equilibria
of these economies do not fully reveal private information.
Though in different settings, the common intuition behind these economies
is consistent. First of all, households’ bid rents reflect their ex ante valuations
for housing, and the expected valuations reflect households’ information (and
their prior distributions) about the states. However, the equilibrium bid rent
reveals only the winner’s valuation, instead of being determined by all house-
holds’ valuations. Therefore, in urban economics, the equilibrium price of
land reflects only the ex ante valuation and the information of the household
with the highest willingness-to-pay for a location. In contrast, the standard
general equilibrium model has aggregate excess demand that is dependent
on every household’s demand. This generates complete information revela-
tion in equilibrium generically, if there are enough prices. The difference
between the models is due to the standard assumption in urban economics
that each person can be in only one place at one time. In this circumstance,
the equilibrium price might not fully reveal households’ private information,
even if there are many prices and few states. For example, if in equilibrium a
household living in one location has information about another location, this
information might not be revealed in equilibrium rents.
The other important component, that yields an open set of economies
with not all information revealed in equilibrium, concerns perturbations of
utility functions. The set of states affecting utility of households living in
one location is assumed to be different from the set of such states in another
location; in other words, we use a product structure for the state space.
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This is what we mean when we say spatially local perturbations of utility.
Thus, when we consider perturbations of utility functions, we do not allow
the utility of households living in one location to depend even a little on
states belonging to other locations. This is what we mean when we say
perturbations are spatially local.
The model that we present covers both within-city locations and the com-
parison of different cities, though the latter case is the focus of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Two explicit examples give the intuition
behind the non-existence of fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
in Section 2. For generic results, in Section 3, we find an open subset of
economies with no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, provided
that perturbations are spatially local. In Section 4, the existence of rational
expectations equilibrium is demonstrated. When some household is insensi-
tive (to be defined precisely in this section), there exists a unique non-fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium. When all households are not
insensitive, there exists a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
When spatially non-local perturbations are considered, the results are the
same as the ones in standard general equilibrium models, namely generic
existence of fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In this case,
generically households are not insensitive. In Section 5, it is shown that the
introduction of financial markets into our model can restore the existence of
a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, also restoring efficiency
of equilibrium allocations. Whether the introduction of financial markets is
reasonable is also examined. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Examples
Before stating formally and proving the results, let us examine a few ex-
amples. In the first example, one of the households is fully informed, whereas
the other has no information. In the second example, both households have
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partial information about the states of nature in different locations. In both
examples, the equilibrium prices are the same in different states, and hence
illustrate an economy where the rational expectations equilibria do not fully
reveal the private information of households. Examples similar to these ap-
pear in the literature on rational expectations in the standard general equi-
librium model, though in that literature they belong to the complement of a
generic set, and have a very different flavor.
2.1 The Framework
Suppose there are n households indexed by j ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n} and n lo-
cations, k ∈ K ≡ {1, ..., n}, each endowed with a fixed land supply of s¯k.
We consider the case where consumers obtain different utilities from living
in different locations. These could represent either areas within a city or in
different cities. There are more than two states in each location, ωk ∈ Ωk,
k ∈ K, representing state-dependent preference differences in our model, each
realized with a probability that is common knowledge. Let ω ≡ (ωk)k∈K and
Ω = ×k∈K Ωk denote the state and state space of the economy. Beside loca-
tions, in state ω, each household j has to choose the lot size of his/her house
and the consumption of composite good in k, denoted by sjk(ω), zjk(ω), re-
spectively. Since it is impossible to consume a house at the same instant in
two locations: sjk(ω) > 0 implies sjk′(ω) = 0, ∀k′ 6= k. Such a locational
indivisibility is one of the unique characteristics of land and houses com-
pared to other commodities. To focus on an exchange economy, standard in
both rational expectations general equilibrium and urban economics models,
suppose that household j earns a fixed income Yj of composite good in all
states. To placate urban economists, we shall introduce a commuting cost,
but all of our arguments hold when commuting cost is set to zero and there
is only a utility difference between locations. Consider location 1 as a central
business district (CBD) and other locations as suburbs. All job opportunities
are located in the CBD. Following Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (2001),
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there is only commuting from location k, k > 1 to the CBD, where the com-
muting cost from location k to the CBD is denoted by Tk. It is assumed
0 = T1 < T2 < ... < Tn < min (Yj)j∈N to ensure that there is no vacant
location.
Each household can consume housing in only one location. Denote house-
hold j’s consumption plan in k in state ω as ψjk(ω) ≡ (sjk(ω), zjk(ω)) and
let ψj(ω) ≡ (ψjk(ω))k∈K denote j’s consumption plan in state ω in all lo-
cations. The ex post utility function of household j living in k in state ω,
given ψjk(ω), is denoted by ujk(ψjk(ω), ω), ω ∈ Ω, and the ex post utility of
household j choosing to live in their optimal location is
uj(ψj(ω), ω) ≡ maxk {(ujk(ψjk(ω), ω)k∈K}, ω ∈ Ω.
Let pk(ω) denote the rent per unit of housing in location k in state ω, k ∈ K,
ω ∈ Ω, and normalize the price of freely mobile composite consumption good
to be 1. Let Pk(ω) ≡ [pk(ω) 1] be the price vector for housing and composite
good in k in state ω where the composite good is numeraire. The general
optimization problem for household j ∈ N with n locations, given his/her
information structure Fj, is:4
max
ψj(ω)
Euj(ψj(ω)|Fj)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Pk(ω)ψjk(ω) +
∑
k∈K
p sjk(ω)∑
k′∈K sjk′(ω)
q Tk ≤ Yj,
ψjk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ψjk′(ω) = 0, ∀k, k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k
ψj(ω) ∈ R2n+ is Fj-measurable. (1)
Let P (ω) ≡ (Pk(ω))k∈K denote the prices in all locations in state ω. The
rents are collected and consumed by an absentee landlord L who owns all the
housing and whose utility is uL((sLk)k∈K, zL) = zL in all states. The landlord
is endowed with an inelastic supply of housing in all locations. Households
4The ceiling function, denoted by pθq, is defined by the smallest integer greater than
or equal to θ, i.e., pθq ≡ min{n ∈ Z|θ ≤ n}. Notice that p sjk(ω)∑
k′∈K sjk′ (ω)
q can be either 1
or 0, depending on whether household j lives in location k or not.
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can augment their private information by and only by using the information
conveyed by prices.5 Let P : Ω → R2n+ and ψj : Ω →
⋃
k∈K R2+ be mappings
from the state space to the price space and j’s consumption space, respec-
tively. The information that prices convey to all agents is denoted by σ(P ),
the sub-σ-field of F generated by the vector-valued random variable P . Let
µ denote a (countably) additive probability measure defined on (Ω,F), and
then E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)] ≡
∑
ω∈Ω uj(ψj(ω), ω) µ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)) is
household j’s expected utility of choosing ψj,6 based on private information
and the information given by P ∗. Following Allen (1981), the concept of
rational expectations equilibrium is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as an equivalence
class of F-measurable price functions P ∗ : Ω → R2n+ , and for each j ∈ N ,
an equivalence class of Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)-measurable allocation functions ψ∗j : Ω→⋃
k∈K R2+ such that
(i) P ∗k (ω) · ψ∗jk(ω) ≤ Yj − Tk for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω;
(ii) If ψ′j : Ω →
⋃
k∈K R2+ satisfies the informational constraint that ψ
′
j is
Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)-measurable and the budget constraint P ∗k (ω) · ψ′jk(ω) ≤ Yj − Tk,
∀k ∈ K, for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, then ∀j ∈ N ,
E[uj(ψ′j(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)] ≤ E[uj(ψ∗j(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗)];
(iii)
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N z∗jk(ω)+ z∗L(ω)+
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈Np
s∗jk(ω)∑
k′∈K s∗jk′ (ω)
q Tk =
∑
j∈N Yj,∑
j∈N s∗jk(ω) = s¯k, and for each j, ψ
∗
jk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ψ∗jk′(ω) =
0, ∀k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
Condition (i) shows that budget constraint holds for every state that can
happen with a positive probability. Condition (ii) represents maximization
of expected utility subject to the budget. Condition (iii) represents material
balance and restricts each consumer to own housing in one and only one lo-
cation. This is the minimal perturbation of the standard general equilibrium
5When households condition their expectations on additional market variables, the
equilibrium concept is defined as a generalized rational expectations equilibrium; see Allen
(1998).
6Following Aumann (1976), the join Fj∨σ(P ∗) denotes the coarsest common refinement
of Fj and σ(P ∗).
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model necessary to make it compatible with urban economics, i.e., it is the
standard general equilibrium model with a standard assumption in urban
economics that restricts each consumer to consume housing in one and only
one location. In what follows, we will introduce and solve for a bid rent equi-
librium with uncertainty, which is equivalent to the solution of a standard
market equilibrium (see Lemma 1 below). This device is common in urban
economics, and is used “almost everywhere.”
Given a vector of households’ utility levels in state ω, u(ω) ≡ (uj(ω))j∈N ,
bid rent Ψjk(uj(ω), ω) is the maximum rent per unit of housing that the
household j is willing to pay for residing in k in state ω while enjoying a given
utility level uj(ω), j ∈ N , k ∈ K. Similar to that households may learn extra
information from P ∗ in Definition 1, for a given u∗(ω) ≡ (u∗j(ω))j∈N , denote
Ψ∗(ω) ≡ (Ψ∗k(ω))k∈K, where Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)},
then households form expected utilities based on private information and
the information revealed by Ψ∗; however, Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω) is determined by
households’ optimization. Given u∗ : Ω → Rn+ and Ψ∗ : Ω → Rn+, map-
pings from the state space to the utility and the bid rent space, respec-
tively, denote Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω) ≡ maxψjk(ω){
Yj−Tk−zjk(ω)
sjk(ω)
|E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj ∨
σ(Ψ∗)] = u∗j(ω)}, a bid rent equilibrium is constituted when the given map-
pings u∗, Ψ∗ and the corresponding Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω) are consistent in that
Ψ∗k(ω) = maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)}, ∀k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. As shown in Figure
5, Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω) is in fact the slope of j’s budget line in location k that
is tangent to his/her indifference curve with a utility level u∗j(ω). When
we solve the maximization problem of Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω), we obtain the op-
timal lot size Sjk(u∗j(ω), ω). Comparing to ψjk(ω) ≡ (sjk(ω), zjk(ω)) in
a standard utility-maximization problem, here we denote ϕjk(uj(ω), ω) ≡
(Sjk(uj(ω), ω), Zjk(uj(ω), ω)) to be the optimal consumptions (arg max) in
a bid-maximization problem. It can be checked that Sjk(u∗j(ω), ω) = sjk(ω)
when Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω) = pk(ω) when u∗j(ω) = ujk(ψjk(ω)) is given. Further-
more, recall again that in Lemma 1, we will show that the solutions of these
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two maximization problems are exactly the same. Given u∗, for notational
convenience, also denote S∗jk(ω) ≡ Sjk(u∗j(ω), ω), Z∗jk(ω) ≡ Zjk(u∗j(ω), ω)),
ϕ∗jk(ω) ≡ (S∗jk(ω), Z∗jk(ω)), and ϕ∗j(ω) ≡ (ϕ∗jk(ω))k∈K.
Definition 2 A bid rent equilibrium is defined by an equivalence class of
F-measurable house price functions Ψ∗ : Ω → Rn+, and for each j ∈ N , an
equivalence class of Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)-measurable utility functions u∗j : Ω → R+
such that for each location k ∈ K, for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω:
Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = maxj {Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω)}; (2)
ϕ∗jk(ω) ≡ ϕjk(u∗j(ω), ω)
=



argmaxψjk(ω){
Yj−Tk−zjk(ω)
sjk(ω)
∣∣E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] = u∗j(ω)}
if j ∈ argmaxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)},
(0, 0) if j /∈ argmaxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)};
(3)
∑
j∈N
S∗jk(ω) = s¯k,
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
Z∗jk(ω) + z∗L(ω) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
p
S∗jk(ω)∑
k′∈K S∗jk′(ω)
q Tk =
∑
j∈N
Yj,
and ϕ∗jk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ϕ∗jk′(ω) = 0, ∀k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k, ∀j ∈ N. (4)
Here, condition (2) shows that the equilibrium housing price in every
location is determined by the highest bid rent among households for the
housing there. Condition (3) shows that the equilibrium consumption of the
household who lives in k maximizes that household’s bid rent in k, given
his private information and the information revealed by equilibrium prices.
Again, condition (4) represents material balance and the standard urban
economics assumption that each consumer lives in one and only one location.
That is, for each uj(ω), there exists Ψjk(uj(ω), ω) such that the budget line is
tangent to j’s indifference curve with utility uj(ω) at ϕjk(uj(ω), ω). The bid
rent equilibrium requires that, given the equilibrium utility levels and prices,
the corresponding consumptions must satisfy the feasibility and indivisibility
conditions.
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Since each household can consume housing in at most one location, the
consumption set is
⋃
k∈K R2+, and the ex post state-dependent preferences of
living in k, k ∈ K, can be specified by utilities ujk : Ωk → κjk, where κjk is
a compact subset of Cr(R2+,R), r ≥ 2, endowed with the weak Cr compact-
open topology. Assume that for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, ujk(ϕ, ω) ∈ κjk
satisfies for each ϕ ∈ R2+:
(a) strict (differentiable) monotonicity: Dϕujk(ϕ, ω) ∈ R++,
(b) strict (differentiable) concavity: Dϕϕujk(ϕ, ω) is negative definite, and
(c) smooth boundary condition: the closure in R2 of the upper contour set
{ϕ′ ∈ R2++|ujk(ϕ′, ω) ≥ ujk(ϕ, ω)} is contained in R2++.
These conditions ensure that every household’s state-dependent preferences
are smooth in the sense of Debreu (1972) so that, conditional on any state
with a positive probability, demands are well defined Cr−1 functions. Our
examples satisfy these assumptions.
Although it is well-known that bid-rent and competitive equilibria are
closely connected (see for example Fujita, 1989), results in the literature cover
only the context of no uncertainty. If the rational expectations equilibria were
known to be fully revealing, this result could be applied state by state. We
require an equivalence result in the context of uncertainty, especially when
the rational expectations equilibrium might not be fully revealing. The proof
uses classical duality.
Lemma 1 Given that all households’ preferences are representable by a util-
ity function satisfying conditions (a), (b), and (c), (Ψ∗(ω), u∗(ω)) constitutes
a bid rent equilibrium if and only if the corresponding (Ψ∗(ω), (ϕ∗j(ω))j∈N)
constitutes a rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2 Example 1
Suppose that there are two households (j ∈ {1, 2}) with the same income
(Y1 = Y2 = Y ), and two locations (k ∈ {x, y}) with land endowments x¯
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and y¯, respectively. Household 1’s utility is state-dependent but the utility
function of household 2 is independent of states. In each location k, there
are two states (Low and High) denoted by ωk ∈ Ωk ≡ {L,H}, k ∈ {x, y},
which are equally likely to occur and the states in different locations are
not correlated. What each agent can observe are events that are subsets
of Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy. Denote ω ≡ ωx × ωy as an element of Ω. Furthermore,
household 1 has no information, and household 2 knows what the state will
be. That is, households’ information is represented respectively by F1 =
{φ,Ωx} × {φ,Ωy}, F2 = {φ, {H}, {L},Ωx} × {φ, {H}, {L},Ωy} which are
sub-σ-fields of F , where F ≡ F1 ∨ F2 is the smallest σ-field generated by
the class F1
⋃
F2 of subsets of Ω = {HH,HL, LH,LL}. Everything except
the true state is common knowledge, so households are assumed to know the
relationship between states and prices.
Given information structure F1, the superscripts on household 1’s alloca-
tion can be ignored for simplicity until he/she learns something. Utilities will
be Cobb-Douglas. The optimization problem for household 1 is to maximize
expected utility subject to the budget constraint:
max
s1x,s1y,z1x,z1y
Eu1(s1x, s1y, z1x, z1y|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], E[βω1 ln(s1y) + ln(z1y)|F1]}
s.t. px(ω)s1x + py(ω)s1y + z1x + z1y + p
s1y
s1x + s1y
q t ≤ Y,
s1k s1l = 0, s1k z1l = 0, z1k z1l = 0,
s1k, z1k ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l,
where αω1 , βω1 ∈ R++. In contrast, since household 2’s utility is state-independent,
his/her optimization problem is, for all ω ∈ Ω,
max
s2x(ω),s2y(ω),z2x(ω),z2y(ω)
u2(s2x(ω), s2y(ω), z2x(ω), z2y(ω), ω)
= max{α2 ln(s2x(ω)) + ln(z2x(ω)), β2 ln(s2y(ω)) + ln(z2y(ω))}
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s.t. px(ω)s2x(ω) + py(ω)s2y(ω) + z2x(ω) + z2y(ω)
+p
s2y(ω)
s2x(ω) + s2y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s2k(ω) s2l(ω) = 0, s2k(ω) z2l(ω) = 0, z2k(ω) z2l(ω) = 0,
s2k(ω),z2k(ω) ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l,
where α2, β2 ∈ R++. Suppose that household 1 likes the housing in CBD (x)
more than household 2, and household 2 prefers y more than household 1,
i.e., E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[βω1 ] < β2.
In urban economics, as studied by Alonso (1964), bid rent describes a
particular household’s willingness to pay for housing in terms of compos-
ite commodity, given a fixed utility level. Following Fujita (1989) and our
Lemma 1, people live where their bid rents are maximal in equilibrium, and
these bid rents constitute equilibrium rents. The bid rent functions of the
two households for the housing in x and y are
Ψ1x(Eu1, ω) = maxs1x
Y − eEu1(s1x)−E[α
ω
1 ]
s1x
, (5)
Ψ1y(Eu1, ω) = maxs1y
Y − t− eEu1(s1y)−E[β
ω
1 ]
s1y
, (6)
Ψ2x(u2(ω), ω) = max
s2x(ω)
Y − eu2(ω)(s2x(ω))−α2
s2x(ω)
, (7)
Ψ2y(u2(ω), ω) = max
s2y(ω)
Y − t− eu2(ω)(s2y(ω))−β2
s2y(ω)
, (8)
where ω ∈ Ω. From first and second-order conditions, the optimal land lot
sizes for households are
S∗1x(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y
]
1
E[αω1 ] , (9)
S∗1y(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[βω1 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω1 ] , (10)
S∗2x(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + α2)
Y ]
1
α2 , (11)
S∗2y(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + β2)
Y − t ]
1
β2 . (12)
From market clearing conditions S∗jx(ω) = x¯ and S∗jy(ω) = y¯, ∀ω ∈ Ω, we
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have
Eu∗1 =
{
ln[Y ] + E[αω1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], if household 1 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + E[βω1 ] ln[y¯]− ln[1 + E[βω1 ]], if household 1 lives at y,
(13)
u∗2(ω) =
{
ln[Y ] + α2 ln[x¯]− ln[1 + α2], if household 2 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + β2 ln[y¯]− ln[1 + β2], if household 2 lives at y,
(14)
for ω ∈ Ω. So the equilibrium bid rents of agents in the two locations in two
states are
Ψ∗1x(ω) =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯ , (15)
Ψ∗1y(ω) =
E[βω1 ]
1 + E[βω1 ]
Y − t
y¯
, (16)
Ψ∗2x(ω) =
α2
1 + α2
Y
x¯
, (17)
Ψ∗2y(ω) =
β2
1 + β2
Y − t
y¯
, (18)
for ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are presented in Figure 1, where
the horizontal axis represents the location and transportation cost while the
vertical axis represents the individuals’ bid rents.
Since E[α
ω
1 ]
1+E[αω1 ]
> α21+α2 if and only if E[α
ω
1 ] > α2, given E[αω1 ] > α2, the
bid rent of household 1 for the housing in x is higher than that of household
2 for the housing in x in both states. Similarly, since E[β
ω
1 ]
1+E[βω1 ]
< β21+β2 if and
only if E[βω1 ] < β2, E[βω1 ] < β2 implies that the bid rent of household 1
for the housing in y is lower than that of household 2 for the housing in y
in all states. Therefore, the equilibrium location pattern where household 1
lives at x and household 2 lives in y is verified under the conditions we have
assumed.
Notice that there is no equilibrium that fully reveals information. If in
equilibrium Ψ∗x(HH) = Ψ∗x(HL) 6= Ψ∗x(LH) = Ψ∗x(LL), the valuation of
household 1 for the housing in x differs in different states (in location x),
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Figure 1: The bid rent functions in Example 1, where the dotted lines
represent Ψ∗1k(HL) and Ψ∗1k(LH), respectively.
which conflicts with the assumption that household 1 has no information
about the state. Notice also that Ψ∗x(ω) and Ψ∗y(ω) depend only on the mean
of α1, β2, and the values of Y , t, x¯, and y¯. Therefore, the equilibrium rents
in the two locations are independent of the realized state, and there exists no
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium. Even though household 2
knows the state, since household 2 doesn’t care about the state, equilibrium
prices don’t reveal it.
2.3 Example 2
Follow the same setting as in the previous example, but suppose that house-
hold 1 knows the state in location y, but has no information about location
x. On the other hand, household 2 knows only the state in x, but not
the state in y. Let Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy, where Ωx = Ωy ≡ {H,L} represent
the state spaces in locations x and y. F1 = {φ,Ωx} × {φ,Ωy, {H}, {L}},
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F2 = {φ,Ωx, {H}, {L}} × {φ,Ωy} ⊆ F are sub-σ-fields representing private
information. Again, the relationship between states and prices is common
knowledge.
Each household chooses to live in one and only one location. Moreover,
households make their decisions simultaneously. Given an event ω ∈ Ω, both
households’ utilities are state-dependent, so their optimization problems are
max
s1x,s1y(ω),z1x,z1y(ω)
Eu1(s1x, s1y(ω), z1x, z1y(ω)|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], βω1 ln(s1y(ω)) + ln(z1y(ω))}
s.t. px(ω)s1x + py(ω)s1y(ω) + z1x + z1y(ω) + p
s1y(ω)
s1x(ω) + s1y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s1x s1y(ω) = 0, s1x z1y(ω) = 0, z1x s1y(ω) = 0, z1x z1y(ω) = 0,
s1x,s1y(ω), z1x, z1y(ω) ≥ 0;
max
s2x(ω),s2y,z2x(ω),z2y
Eu2(s2x(ω), s2y, z2x(ω), z2y|F2)
= max{αω2 ln(s2x(ω)) + ln(z2x(ω)), E[βω2 ln(s2y) + ln(z2y)|F2]}
s.t. px(ω)s2x(ω) + py(ω)s2y + z2x(ω) + z2y + p
s2y(ω)
s2x(ω) + s2y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s2x(ω) s2y = 0, s2x(ω) z2y = 0, z2x(ω) s2y = 0, z2x(ω) z2y = 0,
s2x(ω),s2y, z2x(ω), z2y ≥ 0;
Note that, in fact, the optimized utility of household 1 is state-dependent at y,
denoted by u∗1y(ω), and state-independent at x, denoted by Eu∗1x; u∗2x(ω) and
Eu∗2y are similarly defined. To present a rational expectations equilibrium
without revelation of private information, suppose that E[αω1 ] > αω2 and
E[βω2 ] > βω1 , for all ω ∈ Ω.
Given these conditions, suppose that households 1 and 2 choose to live in
locations x and y, respectively. Their bid rent functions are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
Ψ1x(Eu1, ω) = maxs1x
Y − eEu1s−E[α
ω
1 ]
1x
s1x
, (19)
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Ψ1y(u1(ω), ω) = maxs1y
Y − t− eu1(ω)s−β
ω
1
1y
s1y
, (20)
Ψ2x(u2(ω), ω) = maxs2x
Y − eu2(ω)s−α
ω
2
2x
s2x
, (21)
Ψ2y(Eu2, ω) = maxs2y
Y − t− eEu2s−E[β
ω
2 ]
2y
s2y
. (22)
Thus, the optimal lot sizes for household 1 and 2 are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
S∗1x(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y ]
1
E[αω1 ] , (23)
S∗1y(u1(ω), ω) = [
eu1(ω)(1 + βω1 )
Y − t ]
1
βω1 , (24)
S∗2x(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + αω2 )
Y
]
1
αω2 , (25)
S∗2y(Eu2, ω) = [
eEu2(1 + E[βω2 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω2 ] . (26)
From S∗jx(ω) = x¯ and S∗jy(ω) = y¯, ∀ω ∈ Ω, we have
Eu∗1(·|F1) =
{
ln[Y ] + E[αω1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], if household 1 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + βω1 ln[y¯]− ln[1 + βω1 ], if household 1 lives at y,
(27)
Eu∗2(·|F2) =
{
ln[Y ] + αω2 ln[x¯]− ln[1 + αω2 ], if household 2 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + E[βω2 ] ln[y¯]− ln[1 + E[βω2 ]], if household 2 lives at y.
(28)
Again, households’ equilibrium bid rents are
Ψ∗1x(ω) =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯ , (29)
Ψ∗1y(ω) =
βω1
1 + βω1
Y − t
y¯
, (30)
Ψ∗2x(ω) =
αω2
1 + αω2
Y
x¯ , (31)
Ψ∗2y(ω) =
E[βω2 ]
1 + E[βω2 ]
Y − t
y¯ , (32)
where ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are drawn in Figure 2, where the
horizontal axis represents the location and transportation cost, whereas the
individual bid rents are represented by the vertical axis.
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Figure 2: The bid rent functions in Example 2, where the dotted lines
represent Ψ∗1k(HL), Ψ∗1k(LH), Ψ∗2k(HL), and Ψ∗2k(LH), respectively.
Inequalities E[αω1 ] > αω2 and E[βω2 ] > βω1 , ∀ω, imply that the bid rent
of household 1 (household 2) for the housing in x (y) is always higher than
that of household 2 (household 1). So the equilibrium location pattern where
household 1 lives at x and household 2 lives at y is verified.7
Again, there is no fully revealing equilibrium in this example. Since Ψ∗x
and Ψ∗y depend only on Y , t, the mean of the preference parameters and the
endowments of land in each location, the equilibrium bid rents are the same
in all the realized states. That is, the mapping from prices to preferences
is not injective, so fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium does not
exist.8
7Even when households can observe other households’ consumption (of housing and
composite good), given that the states in two locations are not correlated, the non-existence
of fully-revealing generalized rational expectations equilibria (GREE) still holds in this
example.
8In these two examples, each household has either full information or no informa-
tion about the state of a location. We can consider another example where each house-
hold has partial information about the state of a location, i.e.,Ωx = Ωy = {H,M,L},
F1 = {φ, {H,M}, {L},Ωx} × {φ, {H}, {M,L},Ωy}, and F2 = {φ, {H}, {M,L},Ωx} ×
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These examples illustrate different causes for the equilibrium not fully
revealing private information: The first example arises because the informed
household doesn’t care about different states. The second one arises due to
the mismatch between informed households and their locations. In the next
section, we show that these unfortunate circumstances can persist under
small perturbations.
3 An Open Subset of Economies without Fully
Revealing Equilibria
The examples represent two points in the space of economies with no fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In this section, we generalize the
examples and show that, in economies under uncertainty where there is no
market for contingent claims or financial contracts, fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium is not present for an open set of economies. But
for all parameters satisfying a condition, there exists a rational expectations
equilibrium (that might not be fully revealing). This will be proved in the
next section.
Suppose there are two households (j ∈ N ≡ {1, 2}), and two locations
(k ∈ K ≡ {x, y}). Let Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy = {H,L} × {H,L} be the finite
payoff-relevant state space of the economy. Households are assumed to max-
imize their conditional expected utilities, where the ex post state-dependent
preferences of living in location k are specified by ujk : Ωk → κjk, where
κjk is a compact subset of Cr(R2+,R) functions, r ≥ 2, which is endowed
with the weak Cr compact-open topology. For each state ω, the economy
(Y, uj(ψj(ω), ω)j∈N) is a smooth economy as defined by Debreu (1972). It is
important to notice that ujk is payoff-relevant to only Ωk, that is, we assume
that people living in location k care only about the state in k. Later, we
{φ, {H,M}, {L},Ωy}. Then if household 1 (2) lives in x (y) in equilibrium, except in state
LL, states of two locations are not fully revealed by equilibrium bid rents. So there does
not exist a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
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consider the perturbations that maintain this property.
Before we prove the results, some characteristics of equilibrium must be
defined. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the information can be fully
revealing, which means that all households can learn the state of nature by
observing the equilibrium price and using their private information. Alterna-
tively, the information can be non-fully revealing in a rational expectations
equilibrium, where at least one household cannot tell the state of nature from
the equilibrium price and their private information. Their formal definitions
are as follows.
Definition 3 A fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is a rational
expectations equilibrium such that
Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗) = F , ∀j ∈ N. (33)
When there is at least one j such that the above equality does not hold, we
say it is a non-fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
In other words, conditioning on a fully revealing equilibrium price func-
tion is equivalent to knowing the pooled information of all households in the
economy. Though Allen (1981) proves the existence of an open and dense
subset of economies with fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in
the classical framework, when perturbations location-by-location are consid-
ered, Theorem 1 will show that the same statement does not hold in urban
economics. Utility functions defined location-by-location are formally called
local utilities.9 We have been using them in this paper up to this point.
Definition 4 (Local Utilities)
Households’ preferences are called local when their preferences satisfy ∀j ∈
N, k ∈ K, ujk : Ωk → κjk. If for some j, k, there exists k′, k′ 6= k such that
ujk : Ωk ×Ωk′ → κjk is not constant for some ωk′, ω′k′ ∈ Ωk′ , then it is called
non-local.
9Throughout this paper, only preference perturbations are considered since endowment
perturbations give households more information if they are state-dependent, and pertur-
bations of ex ante information are not smooth.
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That is, saying that utilities are local requires that each household’s util-
ity at location k is measurable with respect to only Ωk when they live in
location k. We shall require that when utility functions are perturbed, if
they start local, they remain local. We call this a “spatially local perturba-
tion.” Spatially local perturbation means that if people living in a location
care only about the state in the location where they live, then when their
utility function is perturbed, it continues to have this property. Spatially
local perturbations are more realistic than non-local perturbations in urban
economics, since it is not persuasive to say that the perturbed preferences
conditional on residence in location k depend on the state in another loca-
tion. For example, when preference perturbations are considered, in most
cases, the state of commuting congestion or crime (or the quality of schools)
in Chicago is irrelevant to that in New York. Therefore, in urban economics,
it doesn’t make sense to consider spatially non-local perturbations as used
in standard models. Throughout this paper, to highlight the distinct essence
of urban economics, we focus on spatially local perturbations.
It is possible to add other kinds of perturbations to the model, for example
national or regional uncertainty, but this would only complicate notation.
Theorem 1 Given the discrete state space Ω, consider local perturbations
of households’ preferences. There exists an open subset of economies that
possess no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Consider example 1 first. Notice that in equilibrium, household 1’s
marginal rate of substitution for housing in terms of composite commodity
in location x is E[α
ω
1 ]
1+E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯ . On the other hand, household 2’s marginal rate of
substitution for housing in x is α
ω
2
1+αω2
Y
x¯ . Let α
HH
1 = αHL1 > αLH1 = αLL1 and
βHH1 = βLH1 > βHL1 = βLL1 .
Since in the example E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[βω1 ] < β2, we can choose α =
E[αω1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[αω1 ]+α2)x¯
> 0, β = β2−E[β
ω
1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[βω1 ]+β2)y¯
> 0, and  =
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min{α, β}. Recall that the equilibrium marginal utilities in example 1 are
v∗ ≡ (Ds1xEu∗1, Ds1yEu∗1, Dz1xEu∗1, Dz1yEu∗1, Ds2xu∗2(ω), Ds2yu∗2(ω), Dz2xu∗2(ω), Dz2yu∗2(ω)).
(34)
Centered at v∗, consider all spatially local perturbations of utility functions
within an open set in the weak Cr topology such that
Ds1kEu1 ∈ (Ds1kEu∗1 − ,Ds1kEu∗1 + ), (35)
Dz1kEu1 ∈ (Dz1kEu∗1 − ,Dz1kEu∗1 + ), (36)
Ds2ku2(ω) ∈ (Ds2ku∗2(ω)− ,Ds2ku∗2(ω) + ), (37)
Dz2ku2(ω) ∈ (Dz2ku∗2(ω)− ,Dz2ku∗2(ω) + ), k ∈ K. (38)
These perturbations are evaluated in k, k ∈ K, individually, and are thus
spatially local perturbations. Then it can be checked that all utilities within
this neighborhood generate bid rents that are within  of the equilibrium
bid rents in example 1. Furthermore, household 1’s realized marginal rate of
substitution for housing in terms of composite good in location x is always
higher than the marginal rate of substitution of household 2; household 2’s
marginal rate of substitution for housing in location y is always higher than
that of household 1.10
Now we can prove the non-existence of fully revealing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium for all economies in this neighborhood. Suppose for any
set of preferences within these spatially local perturbations, there exists a
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2,Ψ∗). Then the un-
informed household (household 1) can infer the state of nature by observing
Ψ∗. However, within the perturbations, the equilibrium bid rents are the
same across states, contradicting that Ψ∗ is a fully-revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium price.
10In location x, for example, since the lowest MRS for household 1 is E[α
ω
1 ]/x¯−
(1+E[αω1 ])/Y+
,
and the highest MRS for household 2 is α2/x¯+(1+α2)/Y− , household 1’s MRS is greater
than household 2’s MRS if and only if  < α = E[α
ω
1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[αω1 ]+α2)x¯
. Simi-
larly, household 2’s MRS in location y is greater than that of household 1 if and only
if  < β = β2−E[β
ω
1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[βω1 ]+β2)y¯
.
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Obviously, a similar argument works for the cases with more than 2 states
and example 2. Q.E.D.
This paper shows that if one household has the information about a spe-
cific location, if he doesn’t live there in equilibrium, the housing price in that
location will not reveal his information. If a household lives in the location
about which he is informed, there is an information gain (in that he can
maximize ex post utility instead of expected utility), but also a information
spillover to all other households in that they can learn private information
about that location by observing the equilibrium housing price. When lo-
cal utility and spatially local perturbations are considered, the information
spillover plays no role for the households living in other locations. However,
when spatially non-local perturbations are considered, a small perturbation
makes the states of all locations relevant to the utility of living in k. So,
as shown in Allen (1981), there exists an open and dense set of economies
possessing fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
Finally, we make a remark here: If there is no fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium, an equilibrium allocation can fail to be Pareto op-
timal. Consider a variation of Example 1 shown in Figure 3. When the
probability is quite evenly distributed over states in Ωk, k = 1, 2, household
1’s bid rent for the CBD is larger than that of household 2, and household 2’s
bid rent for location 2 is larger than that of household 1. So in equilibrium,
household j lives in location j, j = 1, 2 in both states. However, in a Pareto
optimum, household j lives in 3− j, j = 1, 2 when ω = LH. Therefore, we
have an example with an equilibrium allocation that is ex ante but not ex
post efficient.
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Figure 3: The non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium alloca-
tion can fail to be Pareto optimal.
4 The Existence of Rational Expectations Equi-
librium
After presenting an open subset of economies that possess non-fully-revealing
rational expectations equilibrium, it is natural to ask: Can a rational expec-
tations equilibrium fail to exist in urban economies? This can undermine
the minimal requirement for further analysis in urban economics with un-
certainty. In this section, the existence of (not necessarily fully-revealing)
rational expectations equilibrium is examined, given the assumption of or-
dered relative steepness of bid-rents. First we describe how the existence of
equilibrium depends on the number of locations relative to the number of
households.
When the number of locations is greater than the number of households,
since each household can consume housing in at most one location, there
must exist at least one location where no household lives. In these abandoned
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locations, by Walras’ Law, the price of housing is zero. Therefore, unless the
commuting cost is very high and these locations are far away from the CBD,
households have an incentive to move into these locations to enjoy a higher
utility. In this case, there is no equilibrium.
When the number of locations is the same as the number of households,
the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents ensures that every
location is occupied by exactly one household in equilibrium. Therefore, we
can settle households one-by-one from the core to periphery in the order of
the slopes of their bid rents, constituting an equilibrium allocation.11 Thus,
we know ex ante what information will be revealed by equilibrium prices, so
we can add this information to the consumer’s optimization problem. The
case when the number of households is larger than the number of locations
is left to future work. This case is difficult because we don’t know ex ante
(due to an endogenous lot size) where consumers will reside in equilibrium,
so we don’t know what information will be revealed by equilibrium prices.
This would be the case, for example, if there were a continuum of consumers.
Suppose there are n households and n locations. Before proving a theorem
on the existence of equilibrium, we need to make following assumptions on
households’ bid rents. These assumptions are standard in urban economics;
see for example Fujita (1985, 1989).12 To avoid abuse of notation, let s˜j(t, ω)
and z˜j(t, ω) denote the consumptions of lot size and composite good at a
distance t from the CBD in state ω. Given a specific state ω and a utility level
u, denote Ψ˜j(t, u, ω) ≡ maxs˜j(t,ω),z˜j(t,ω){
Yj−t−z˜j(t,ω)
s˜j(t,ω) |uj(t, ω) = u} household
j’s bid rent for housing at distance t from the CBD.13
11Without the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents, we must find a fixed
point in the information structure, which is hard.
12In fact, in standard urban economics, the assumption of ordered relative steepness
relates to only the uniqueness of equilibrium and makes the proof easier, but existence of
equilibrium in urban economics can be proved without this assumption when there is no
uncertainty; see Fujita and Smith (1987).
13Notice that though locations are discrete points on the line representing distance to
the CBD, households’ bid rents are in fact continuous functions of the distance from core.
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Assumption 1 (Ordered Relative Steepness of Bid Rent)
Households’ bid rent functions are ordered by their relative steepnesses. That
is, given j < j ′ ≤ n, Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) is steeper than Ψ˜j′(t, uj, ω): Given ω ∈ Ω,
whenever Ψ˜j(t¯, uj, ω) = Ψ˜j′(t¯, uj′, ω) > 0 for some t¯, uj and uj′, then
Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) > Ψ˜j′(t, uj′, ω) ∀ 0 ≤ t < t¯, (39)
Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) < Ψ˜j′(t, uj′, ω) ∀ t > t¯ wherever Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) > 0. (40)
When households have the same utility function but different incomes,
and when housing is a normal good, ordered relative steepness of bid rents is
naturally satisfied.14 However, when households have different utilities but
the same income, ordered relative steepness of bid rent is not implied. The
assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents ensures that given arbi-
trary levels of utilities for two agents, for each state, their bid rents must cross
at (no more than) one point as shown in Figure 4, where the bid rent curves
shift down as the utility levels increase. For example, the Cobb-Douglas util-
ities in Examples 1 and 2 satisfy the assumption of ordered relative steepness
of bid rents, and so do quasi-linear utilities. In what follows, we prove the ex-
istence of rational expectations equilibrium, given the assumption of ordered
relative steepness of bid rents.
4.1 When households are insensitive
To begin, given ordered steepness of bid rents and the same number of con-
sumers and locations, use Assumption 1 to order consumers so that consumer
1 has the steepest bid rent, consumer 2 the next steepest, and so forth. Since
the examples in Section 2 highlight the condition required for the existence of
non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, in what follows we fo-
cus on the case where households present insensitivity. Recall that the utility
of household j in state ω from living in location j is denoted by ujj(ψjj(ω), ω).
14See Fujita (1989), pages 28-29.
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Figure 4: Example where households’ bid rents satisfy ordered relative
steepness of bid rents.
Definition 5 (Insensitivity)
There exist states (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω × Ω such that for each household j ∈ N such
that ω and ω′ are in different partition elements of Fj and15
Dsjj(ω)ujj(ψjj(ω), ω)
Dzjj(ω)ujj(ψjj(ω), ω)
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗jj(ω)
=
Dsjj(ω′)ujj(ψjj(ω′), ω′)
Dzjj(ω′)ujj(ψjj(ω′), ω′)
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗jj(ω′)
, (41)
but there exists j ′ ∈ N for whom ω and ω′ are in the same element of Fj′
(with a positive probability), u∗j′j′(ψjj(ω), ω) 6= u∗j′j′(ψjj(ω′), ω′).
Given that housing is a normal good, we will show below that equilib-
rium always exists and is unique in our model, and the question then becomes
whether it is fully revealing or not. We will show that insensitivity is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for existence of a non-fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium.
The intuition for the first part of the definition of insensitivity is that
for any household who has information in distinguishing two states, his/her
15States that nobody can distinguish and that do not matter to anyone can be combined.
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marginal rate of substitution in k is independent of these realized states.
However, to ensure that the household’s information is not trivial, we need
the second part of the definition which implies that his/her information about
location k does matter for another household. Insensitivity can result from
one or more of several sources: utility could be quasi-linear, or information
about conditions in one location can be irrelevant to the consumer living
there, or some information is irrelevant to all consumers.
Let P(Ω) be the power set of Ω. Now, consider a public partitional
information function I : Ω → P(Ω)\{φ} such that for every ω ∈ Ω, a
nonempty subset I(ω) of Ω is assigned, where: (1) for every ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ I(ω);
(2) ω′ ∈ I(ω) implies I(ω′) = I(ω). Moreover, for every (ω, ω′) satisfying
insensitivity, I(ω′) = I(ω). This condition implies that when ω and ω′ are
insensitive, and ω′ and ω′′ are insensitive, then I(ω) = I(ω′) = I(ω′′). So it
can be checked that
I(ω) = {ω′
∣∣I(ω′) = I(ω)} (42)
In other words, I(ω) is a partition element collecting states that are di-
rectly or transitively insensitive with ω. Intuitively, for all states in I(ω),
either households have no information to distinguish them, or the informed
household cannot reflect its information by differences in its marginal rate
of substitution. The non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is
supported by the σ-algebra generated by the public partitional information
function.
Theorem 2 Given Assumption 1 and that housing consumption is a normal
good, under insensitivity, for j = 1, ..., n, there is an equivalence class of
σ(I)-measurable bid rent functions Ψ∗ : Ω→ R2n+ and Fj∨σ(Ψ∗)-measurable
consumption functions ϕ∗j : Ω→ R2+ ∪R2+ that constitute a unique non-fully
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revealing rational expectations equilibrium such that, for k ∈ K,
Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψkk(u∗k(ω), ω)
= max
skk(ω),zkk(ω)
{Yk − Tk − zkk(ω)
skk(ω)
∣∣∣E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] = u∗k(ω)};
(43)
ϕ∗jk(ω) ≡ ϕjk(u∗k(ω), ω) =



(s¯k, Yk − Tk −Ψ∗k(ω) s¯k), if j = k,
(0, 0), if j 6= k;
(44)
and the unique equilibrium utility level u∗k(ω), k ∈ K, satisfies
Ψk(u∗k(ω), ω) =
Dskk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗)]
Dzkk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗)]
∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
. (45)
Proof. First, we use the implication from Lemma 1 that bid rent equilib-
rium is a rational expectations equilibrium. Next, a bid rent equilibrium will
be constructed, and the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium will be
proved. Finally, it will be shown that the unique bid rent (rational expecta-
tions) equilibrium is non-fully revealing.
Following a standard argument in urban economics, given Assumption 1,
every location is occupied by exactly one household. Since household 1 has
the steepest bid rent, from equation (2) in Definition 2, he/she must occupy
the housing in location 1 in equilibrium. After settling household 1, we can
consider the problem as the one with n − 1 households (j ∈ {2, ..., n}) and
n − 1 locations (k ∈ {2, ..., n}). Then, household 2 has a steeper bid rents
than remaining households, so his/her equilibrium bid rent for the housing in
location 2 is higher than that of other households. Therefore, in equilibrium,
household 2 occupies the housing in location 2. Following the same logic, in
equilibrium all households are arranged so that household j lives in location
j, j ∈ N , or say that location k is occupied by household k, k ∈ K.
Given that household k is located in location k, as shown in Figure 5,
the intercept of budget line Yk − Tk and the housing supply s¯k are deter-
mined by parameters. Now, given arbitrary u, the slope of budget line
Ψk(u, ω) and the corresponding ϕkk(u, ω) are uniquely determined (by the
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cross point of the budget line and the vertical line s¯k). Furthermore, given
consumption point ϕkk(u, ω), since households’ preferences are smooth, the
slope of the indifference curve passing through ϕ∗kk(u, ω) is uniquely deter-
mined. Letting Φkk(u, ω) ≡
Dskk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω),ω)|Fk∨σ(Ψ
∗)]
Dzkk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω),ω)|Fk∨σ(Ψ
∗)]
∣∣
ϕkk(u,ω)
, the equi-
librium utility level (and the equilibrium housing price in location k) is
given by solving Ψk(u, ω) = Φkk(u, ω), ω ∈ Ω, as shown in Figure 5. Let
fkk(u, ω) ≡ Ψk(u, ω)−Φkk(u, ω), since Ψk and Φkk are continuous in u, fkk is
continuous in u. At E¯, fkk(u, ω) < 0 since Ψk(u, ω) = 0 and Φkk(u, ω) > 0 at
E¯ by monotonicity. Given s¯k > 0, Ψk(u, ω) is increasing as zkk(ω) decreases
and, by the smooth boundary condition, Φkk(u, ω)→ 0 as zkk(ω)→ 0, which
implies that ∃u such that fkk(u, ω) > 0, ∀u ≤ u. Therefore, by the inter-
mediate value theorem, there exists a u∗k(ω) solving fkk(u, ω) = 0, ω ∈ Ω,
and thus, there exists a rational expectations equilibrium. The uniqueness of
equilibrium can be guaranteed by the condition that Φkk(u, ω) is increasing
in u, which is true when the consumption of housing is a normal good as
shown in Berliant and Fujita (1992).
-
6
q
0
skk(ω)
zkk(ω)
z∗kk(ω)
u∗k(ω)
Ψk(u∗k(ω), ω)
ϕkk(u∗k(ω), ω)
s¯k
Yk − Tk E¯
E
Figure 5: The determination of equilibrium housing price and equilibrium
utility for household k in location k in state ω, k ∈ K.
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Under insensitivity, we want to prove that the unique rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is non-fully revealing. Suppose on the contrary that the
equilibrium is fully-revealing, then choosing arbitrary k, we have
Ψ∗k(ω) = Ψkk(u∗(ω), ω) 6= Ψkk(u∗(ω), ω′) = Ψ∗k(ω′), ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. (46)
First, for household k (living in location k in equilibrium), any such pair
(ω, ω′) must be in different partition elements. That is, Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗) = F .
Second, from (43) and (45), we have Ψk(u, ω) 6= Ψk(u, ω′) which implies,
∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
Dskk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
Dzkk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
6=
Dskk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω′), ω′)
Dzkk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω′), ω′)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω′)
. (47)
However, from insensitivity, there exist ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that
Dskk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
Dzkk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
=
Dskk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω′), ω′)
Dzkk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω′), ω′)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω′)
, (48)
a contradiction with (47). In fact, these non-fully revealing equilibrium prices
reveal nothing beyond σ(P (ω))ω∈Ω in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
4.2 When households are not insensitive
Insensitivity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a non-fully re-
vealing rational expectations equilibrium. Since, with insensitivity, there is
some useful information that is not transmitted from informed to uninformed
households, the rational expectations equilibrium is non-fully revealing. Let
σ˜k ≡ σ(Ωk) × (×k′ 6=k{φ,Ωk′}), which is the σ-algebra indicating that only
the state in k is known, whereas all states in other locations are completely
unknown. Without insensitivity, the equilibrium can only be fully-revealing.
Theorem 3 Given Assumption 1 and housing consumption is a normal
good, under no insensitivity, there exists a unique rational expectations equi-
librium that is fully revealing.
Proof. From Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, as in the proof of Theorem 2,
there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which corresponds to the bid
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rent equilibrium. When the insensitivity condition is violated, the realized
marginal rates of substitution are different ∀ωk ∈ Ωk, in k where he/she lives.
Furthermore, with no insensitivity, σ˜k ⊆ Fk for the household k living in k;
otherwise, from footnote 15, there exist ωk, ω′k ∈ Ωk that can be distinguished
by j ′ 6= k who does not live in k, a contradiction with no insensitivity. Since
this is true for all k ∈ K, and the equilibrium bid rent in k is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution of household living in k, so the equilibrium
bid rents are different in each state, implying that the rational expectations
equilibrium is fully revealing. Q.E.D.
In the literature, an open and dense subset of standard economies with
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is found. However, under
the natural assumption of spatially local perturbations of utility functions,
as shown in the previous section, an open subset of urban economies with
only a non-fully revealing equilibrium is found. Recall that, consistent with
what is shown in standard general equilibrium models, there is also an open
subset of urban economies with only fully revealing equilibria: The easiest
way to present this is to exchange the information given to households 1 and
2 in our examples and use spatially local perturbations of utility functions.
Then within these perturbations, the rational expectations equilibrium can
only be fully revealing (since there is no mismatch between the information
known by households and their locations). Therefore, neither the set of fully
revealing nor the set of non-fully revealing economies can be dense under
the structure of urban economics. Non-fully revealing equilibrium is more
interesting in highlighting the potential positive value and the strategic use
of information. When non-local perturbations are considered, though they
are not so reasonable in urban economics, the results are the same as the
ones in standard general equilibrium models. That is, there is an open and
dense subset of economies that possess a fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium.
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As shown in the comparison in Table 1, the inefficiency in information
transmission in a housing/land market rests on two key assumptions: spa-
tially local utility perturbations and the standard setting in urban economics
that every household can consume housing in only one place. When either of
them is violated, the result in standard models is restored. That is, in eco-
nomic circumstances where there is no location structure or no spatially local
property of utility, generically, the efficiency of prices in information trans-
mission is attained in a rational expectations equilibrium. We conclude that
geographic structure, together with spatially local utility properties, can play
a role in distorting the efficiency of the market in transmitting information
from informed to uninformed households.
Households can consume Ordinary consumption set
housing in only one place
Spatially local Open subsets of economies An open and dense subset
utility with fully revealing and of economies with fully
perturbations non-fully revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
(Urban economics)
Spatially An open and dense subset An open and dense subset
non-local of economies with fully of economies with fully
utility revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
perturbations (Standard model)
Table 1: A comparison of the results in this paper with the results in the
literature.
If households can be redistributed so that location is coincident with
information, then we can create a fully-revealing rational expectations equi-
librium. However, this idea seems impractical since in most cases, unless the
households are very risk averse, households’ subjective preferences for loca-
tion do not necessarily depend on the information that they have. A classical
way to induce households to reveal their private information, as shown in De-
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breu (1959) Chapter 7 and Arrow (1964), is to consider contingent claim or
financial markets. This idea is discussed in the next section.
5 Adding Financial Markets
When contingent claims or financial markets are included, do our examples
with no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium survive? This in-
teresting question is examined here.
Similar to Hirshleifer’s (1971) conclusion in cases with technological un-
certainty, speculative profits from price revaluation give individuals incen-
tives to disseminate their information. We show that when there is market
uncertainty, the same incentives exist and thus all households’ information
is revealed in equilibrium.
Following the setting of our Example 1 and Magill and Quinzii (1996),
consider that before consuming composite good and housing, the two house-
holds can buy and sell state-contingent financial securities in financial mar-
kets. That is, consider a one-period, two-stage model as follows. At the
beginning of the first stage, households are endowed with e0j units of nu-
meraire (composite consumer good), j = 1, 2. Household 2 has complete
information about the states in the two locations, whereas household 1 has
no information. The financial markets are opened in stage 1, where the two
households can buy and sell securities. Assume that the financial markets
are complete in that the number of securities is the same as the number of
states, so we can use the same index for securities and states. Specifically,
the security ω, ω ∈ Ω, is a contract promising to deliver one unit of nu-
meraire (income) in state ω, and 0 in other states, in the second stage. All
securities are perfectly monitored and perfectly enforced. After closing the
financial markets and the end of the first stage, the state is realized and all
security returns are paid at the beginning of the second stage. Then an ab-
sentee landlord trades with households in spot housing markets. The game
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is complete when the housing markets are closed. We want to know whether
or not there is a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium under the
new setting.
Let eωj be household j’s endowment in state ω in the second stage, and
let the row vector νj ≡ (νj(ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R4 be household j’s portfolio. Let q ≡
(q(ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R4 and V ≡ (V (ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R16 where q(ω) ∈ R and V (ω) ∈ R4
represent the price vector of security ω and the payoff matrix of securities in
state ω, respectively. That is, V (ω) is a row vector of zeros except that the
element representing state ω is 1, and V (ω) 6= V (ω′), for all ω 6= ω′. The
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium under the new setting can
be solved by backward induction as follows.
Suppose there exists a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
From Section 2.2, given Yj(ω), households’ indirect utility functions with
optimization in stage 2 are
U1(ω) = αω1 ln x¯− ln(1 + αω1 ) + lnY1(ω),
U2(ω) = βω2 ln y¯ − ln(1 + βω2 ) + lnY2(ω).
Through monotonic transformations of these indirect utility functions, house-
hold j’s optimization problem in stage 1 can be written as
max
νj
U˜j(ω) ≡ lnYj(ω)
s.t. q · νTj = e0j ,
Yj(ω)− eωj = V (ω) νTj , ω ∈ Ω,
where νTj denotes the transpose of j’s portfolio vector. Denoting the true
state as ωˆ, since households learn the true state by observing prices in a fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium, it is obvious that the equilibrium
security prices must satisfy q(ωˆ) = 1 and q(ω) = 0, ∀ω 6= ωˆ. Since for
arbitrary different ωˆ, ωˆ′, the corresponding equilibrium price vectors are not
the same, each q∗ reveals a unique ωˆ. Therefore, it follows that q∗ supports
a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
34
Though we show that adding financial markets helps to reveal the in-
formed household’s private information, there are some issues with this idea.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that the informed household can use
their private information to take advantage of uninformed households. Thus,
if the financial markets and the corresponding fully-revealing equilibrium
prices make private information publicly available to every household, the
informed household could not earn an information rent (coming from asym-
metric information) and has an incentive to hide his/her private information
(by pretending to be uninformed). Therefore, though adding financial mar-
kets can restore the existence of a fully-revealing rational expectations equi-
librium, there are reasons why these financial markets might not function.
Of course, if financial asset markets are incomplete for whatever reason, the
problems we have discussed return.
6 Conclusions
Radner (1979), Jordan (1980), and Allen (1981) prove the existence of an
open and dense subset of standard economies that possess fully-revealing
rational expectations equilibria. Since in urban economies there is an open
subset of economies without fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium,
Allen’s theorem about the existence of a dense subset of economies possess-
ing fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium does not extend to ur-
ban economies when spatially local perturbations of utilities are considered.
These perturbations retain the property that the utility of living at a location
depends only on the consumption bundle at that location and the resolution
of uncertainty about local variables only. Furthermore, since an open subset
of economies with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria can eas-
ily be constructed, we cannot challenge the existence of an open subset of
economies that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria in the
context of urban economies. Therefore, neither the set of fully revealing nor
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the set of non-fully revealing economies can be dense under the structure of
urban economics.
This paper highlights the importance of “local conditions” for the exis-
tence of rational expectations equilibria in urban economies. The existence
of a unique rational expectations equilibrium is proved with the assumption
of ordered relative steepness of bid rents. Whether the rational expectations
equilibrium is fully revealing or non-fully revealing depends on the insensi-
tivity condition: When insensitivity is satisfied, the unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium is non-fully revealing; otherwise, the equilibrium is fully
revealing. Though introducing financial markets can restore the existence of
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, many provisos also accom-
pany it. In summary, geography can play a role in undermining the efficiency
of market prices in transmitting information from informed to uninformed
households.
One potential extension of this paper is to consider a continuum of house-
holds; however, the intuition that the mismatch of locally-informed house-
holds and their corresponding equilibrium locations is likely to yield an open
subset of economies possessing only non-fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium seems robust. Other topics for future research are to extend the
intuition behind our results to other models. For example, in an overlap-
ping generations model, time may play a role similar to the spatial structure
in preventing information transmission. Moreover, when search/matching
models are considered, stable equilibrium may also pick only the best of all
potential matches. In either of these cases, we conjecture that there exists an
open subset of economies with no fully-revealing rational expectations equi-
librium, since agents with information about states in other lifetimes (in the
overlapping generations framework) or in other equilibrium matches (in the
search framework) might not have their information reflected in equilibrium
prices.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Comparing Definition 1 and Definition 2, since condition (iii) is the same
as equations (4), for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, we only need to prove that
((ψ∗j(ω))j∈N , P ∗(ω)) satisfies (i) and (ii) if and only if ((ϕ∗j(ω))j∈N ,Ψ∗(ω))
satisfies (2) and (3), given ϕ∗j(ω) = ψ∗j(ω), Ψ∗k(ω) = p∗k(ω), and u∗j(ω) =
ujk(ψ∗jk(ω), ω), ∀j ∈ N , k ∈ K.
First, to prove this, given that (2) and (3) are satisfied but either (i) or
(ii) is not true, we want to show contradictions. If (i) is not true, there exists
Ω0 ⊆ Ω with µ(Ω0) > 0 such that P ∗k (ω) · ψ
∗
jk(ω) > Yk − Tk, ∀ω ∈ Ω0. Then
for ω ∈ Ω0, we have p∗k(ω)s∗jk(ω) + z∗jk(ω) > Yk − Tk, which together with
Ψ∗k(ω) = p∗k(ω) implies
Ψ∗k(ω) >
Yk − Tk − z∗jk(ω)
s∗jk(ω)
, ∀ω ∈ Ω0,
a contradiction with (2) and (3), given that the utility level is the same as
the optimalized level in Definition 1, i.e., u∗j(ω) = ujk(ψ∗jk(ω), ω).
On the other hand, if (ii) is not true, then ∃j ∈ N and ψ′j(ω) within the
budget constraint such that
E[uj(ψ′j(ω), ω)
∣∣Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] > E[uj(ψ∗j(ω), ω)
∣∣Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)]. (49)
For this household j and for location k where he/she lives in equilibrium, we
can choose u∗j(ω) = E[uj(ψ∗j(ω), ω)
∣∣Fj ∨σ(Ψ∗)], and then by strict concavity
and strict monotonicity, there exists  > 0 and ψ′′j (ω) ≡
ψ′j(ω)+ψ∗j (ω)
2 − 
such that E[uj(ψ′′j (ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] = u∗j(ω). Since [Ψ∗k(ω) 1] · ψ
′′
jk(ω) <
Yk− Tk implies Ψ∗k(ω) <
Yk−Tk−z
′′
jk(ω)
s′′jk(ω)
,16 letting p′′k(ω) ≡
Yk−Tk−z
′′
jk(ω)
s′′jk(ω)
, we have
p′′k(ω) > Ψ∗k(ω), though ψ
′′
jk(ω) and ψ∗jk(ω) yield the same expected utility
level u∗j(ω). That is, given u∗j(ω), ψ′′jk(ω) supports a higher p
′′
k(ω) than Ψ∗k(ω).
Therefore, ϕ∗jk(ω) = ψ
∗
jk(ω) does not maximize Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω), a contradiction
with equation (3).
16Recall that Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = maxj{Ψ∗jk(ω)}.
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Secondly, supposing that (i) and (ii) hold, but either (2) or (3) is not
satisfied, we want to prove that there is a contradiction. If (2) does not
hold, there exists k ∈ K, j ∈ N , and Ω0 ⊆ Ω with µ(Ω0) > 0 such that
∀ω ∈ Ω0, Ψ∗jk(ω) > Ψ∗k(ω) but j does not live in location k. Suppose that j
lives in location k′ 6= k. Then for this household j, since he/she can pay less
for the housing in k than the price that makes he/she indifferent between
the housing in k and k′, household j has an incentive to move from k′ into
location k to increase his/her utility in all for all ω ∈ Ω0, a contradiction
with condition (ii) that ϕ∗j maximizes j’s conditional expected utility.
If (3) does not hold, since the budget line with Ψ∗jk(ω) is not tangent to
the indifference curve for a given u for some states ω ∈ Ω0, where µ(Ω0) > 0.
By strict concavity, there exists ψ′jk(ω) 6= ϕ∗jk(ω) such that ujk(ψ
′
jk(ω), ω) =
ujk(ϕ∗jk(ω), ω), and thus E[uj(ψ′j(ω), ω)|Fj∨σ(Ψ∗)] = Eu∗j , where Eu∗j is the
optimal utility level solved from Definition 1. Choosing ψ′′jk(ω) ≡
ϕ∗jk(ω)+ψ
′
jk(ω)
2 ,
then by strict concavity, ψ′′jk(ω) is available for household j in achieving a
higher utility level, i.e., E[uj(ψ′′j (ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] > Eu∗j , a contradiction
with (ii) that ϕ∗j maximizes household j’s expected utility conditional on the
private information and the information revealed by equilibrium prices.
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